China’s Social Credit System: Data, Algorithms and Implications by Kshetri, Nir B. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
China’s Social Credit System: Data, Algorithms and Implications 
 
By: Nir Kshetri 
 
Kshetri, Nir (2020)."China’s Social Credit System: Data, Algorithms and Implications” IEEE IT 
Professional, 22(2), 14-18. https://doi.org/10.1109/MITP.2019.2935662 
 
© 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be 
obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including 
reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating 
new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any 




Data and algorithms for China's social credit system (SCS) are a topic of great current interest. 
Nonetheless, few details regarding China’s SCS have been officially released. What is clear, 
however, is that China's social credit system uses broader criteria than Western systems to rank 
and rate entities. The system is expected to operate through a wider range of mechanisms at the 
public and private spheres in order to assess the trustworthiness of individuals, businesses, and 
professional sectors with a goal to reward good behaviors and punish bad behaviors. A full 
implementation SCS is expected to have wide-ranging impacts on the lives of individuals and 
organizations than Western-style credit systems. The SCS can be considered an instrument of an 
overarching ideology that simply reflects the interests of the CCP leaders. 
 




In 2014, China's State Council developed a roadmap and issued guidelines for establishing a 
social credit system (SCS) by 2020. By then, every adult will have a credit code in addition to a 
government-issued identity card. The existence of such a plan was reported in a document, which 
circulated through various levels of government 
(https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-
construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/). Its broader aims include the promotion of 
positive economic and moral (promotion of socialist core values, such as patriotism, respecting 
the elderly, and working hard) behaviors. Factors, such as financial standing, criminal record, 
and social media behavior, will be used to assign every citizen a numerical rating 
(http://www.ibtimes.com/china-use-big-data-rate-citizens-new-social-credit-system-1898711). It 
is argued that the information included in the rating may also include what books people read. 
 
Individuals with bad credit are likely to be subject to various sanctions, such as financial 
penalties (e.g., no housing or credit to start a company) and ineligibility for certain jobs.2 High-
status and influential positions, such as government official, news reporter, and CEO of a 
company, may require a certain minimum score. 
 
As of early 2018, pilot versions of the program had been implemented in 30 cities 
(https://theweek.com/articles/752442/chinas-black-mirror-moment), which increased to 43 by 
early 2019 (https://www.thenation.com/article/china-social-credit-system/). The stated goal of 
the plan has been to contribute to constructing a harmonious socialist society. It aims to provide 




To be clear, China's SCS is more than just a single system. It uses several systems and uses 
punishments and rewards in order to improve governance and discourage disorder and fraud. 
 
SOPHISTICATED AND COMPLEX ALGORITHMS 
 
There is little public information as to how the SCS will operate when it is fully implemented 
(https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2019/02/25/518567.htm). The SCS uses 
extremely sophisticated and complex algorithms. Until now, there has been no such thing as a 
national “social credit score.” The criteria used in the SCS varied across municipalities that have 
implemented it. They have used systems based on letters or points. Different municipalities had 
different names, such as Plum Blossom Social Credit in Suzhou and Jasmine in Xiamen. Almost 
all have relied on data from social networks or smartphone apps and video surveillance 
(https://www.thenation.com/article/china-social-credit-system/). 
 
A group of researchers recently used content analysis machine learning tools to analyze hundreds 
of thousands of entries from the Beijing SCS website 
(https://www.cybertrust.in.tum.de/fileadmin/w00bzf/www/papers/2019-FAT-Engelmann-
Chen.pdf). The researchers found a higher degree of clarity as to how individuals and businesses 
get punished. For instance, most people on the blacklist had failed to pay their debts or 
committed a traffic violation. However, the positive list, also known as the redlist, was found to 
have a higher degree of vagueness. For instance, the individuals on the redlist were there for 
volunteer activities. However, there was a lack of clear criteria for defining what makes an 
individual a great volunteer. 
 
Data and Algorithms From Government Departments and Private Sector Companies 
 
Based on this broad objective, various government departments and private sector companies are 
providing data and algorithms for the SCS. Some foundation for the SCS had already been laid 
by as early as 2015. In June 2015, the website of Credit China (creditchina.gov.cn) was 
launched, which contained more than 1.13 million pieces of information on credit histories of 
some Chinese residents and firms, such as tax avoidance and failure to follow court rulings. 
Credit China's information comes from various government departments, such as the State 
Administration of Taxation, Supreme People's Court, National Development and Reform 
Commission, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission and local governments 
(http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/07/01/content_281475138273106). 
 
The government assigns universal social credit codes to organizations. These codes can be used 
as an ID number for the purpose of activities, such as registration and tax payments. Likewise, 
all individuals have a national ID number. The existing social credit blacklists rely on these 
numbers. However, these codes currently are not scores or rankings. 
 
The algorithms and data developed and collected by private companies are also expected to be 
used. China has given permission to ten private companies to launch internet-based credit rating 
and ranking systems, which include Alibaba's Ant Financial and Tencent's paywall 
(http://qz.com/519737/all-chinese-citizens-now-have-a-score-based-on-how-well-we-live-and-
mine-sucks/). Alibaba's Sesame Credit is arguably the system that is most admired by 
government authorities (https://www.thenation.com/article/china-social-credit-system/). 
 
Some of the data are already used in government trials. For instance, since 2015, Hangzhou's 
system made use of the private credit-scoring system Sesame Credit. Unlike Western-style credit 
systems, Sesame takes into account a broad range of financial and social behaviors to assess 
consumers’ trustworthiness and creditworthiness.3 
 
Sesame Credit is supposed to serve the same basic functions to traditional credit scores, such as 
Fico in the U.S. Sesame Credit, however, uses opaque algorithms to determine creditworthiness. 
It monitors people's buying habits, credit records, and social circles. Its social credit scores also 
use a debtor's social network. This means that low-score contacts will negatively affect a 
consumer's score (https://theconversation.com/chinas-dystopian-social-credit-system-is-a-
harbinger-of-the-global-age-of-the-algorithm-88348). While Sesame scores vary from 350 and 
950, how Sesame's algorithms calculate the number is anybody's guess. 
 
While banks store large amounts of consumer data on spending habits, strict regulations prohibit 
them from exploiting the data. Banks’ lending decisions largely rely on standard industry scores. 
On the other hand, tech companies often exhibit a tendency to think they can store and analyze 
any data. Tech companies are subject to less strict regulations than banks and, thus, are more 
likely to engage in the abuse of personal information7. 
 
SCS in Relation to the Goals of the Chinese Communist Party 
 
Understanding the goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is critical in order to get 
insights into this system. Broadly speaking, China's state strategies toward ICTs have been to 
balance economic modernization and political control.8 
 
Table 1 presents some major categories of factors that are likely to be included in the SCS. The 
first thing that seems pretty clear is that a key goal of the CCP is to maintain the party's power 
monopoly. The CCP is, thus, interested in using modern ICTs as a tool for maintaining its 
political dominance and preventing the opposition from challenging that dominance. In this way, 
the SCS is viewed as an attempt by the CCP to take advantage of the advancement in computing 
and telecommunications and use sophisticated technologies such as artificial intelligence to 




Table 1. Some major categories of factors likely to be included in the SCS. 
Category Explanation Some possible examples of data (positive/negative 
impact on social credit) 
Political activity 
and ideology 
Negative attitudes towards the ideology 
of the CCP and behaviors that go 
against the norms of the CCP are 
penalized. 
• Criticizing the government on social media (–) 







The rule of law is an important factor 
in determining the CCP’s legitimacy. 
Also a stated goal of the plan is to 
contribute to constructing a 
harmonious socialist society. 
• Engagement in fraud and embezzlement (–) 
• Running a red light (–) 
• Selling contaminated and tainted food to consumers 
(–) 
• Using expired tickets, occupying reserved seats, 
smoking or playing music too loud on trains (–)8 
• False advertising (–) 
(https://tinyurl.com/y3smwjoy) 
• Generation of excessive pollution by companies (–) 
• Walking dog without a leash (–) 




nature of social 
networks 
These factors can contribute to 
construction of a harmonious socialist 
society, reward trustworthy behaviors 
and punish untrustworthy behaviors 
• Taking care of parents (+) 
• Giving to charity (+) 
• Engaging in volunteer activities (+) 
• Being friends with “untrustworthy” individuals (–) 
Role as a productive 
citizen 
Citizens that engage in productive 
economic activities contribute to the 
CCP’s goal of economic 
modernization and promote socialist 
core values. 
• Spending too much time playing video games (–) 
Responsible 
consumer behavior 
A goal of CCP is to promote positive 
economic behaviors that support 
socialist values. 
• Spending money on unnecessary products (–) 
• Avoiding extravagant consumption (+) 
Responsible 
financial behaviors 
Responsible financial behaviors can 
promote the well-being of citizens. 
• Paying bills on time (+) 
 
China heavily regulates organized civil society groups, free speech, and other civil rights. It is, 
thus, possible that the SCS may punish engagement in activities that are considered to be against 
what China classifies as anti-CCP actions.5 
 
This program is reported to have remarkable similarities with the former East German system the 
Stasi. The Stasi is considered to be “[a]mong the most brutal and successful intelligence 
surveillance organizations of the Cold War Years.” Virtually all factories, offices, military units, 
schools, universities, hospitals, churches, and other organizations were believed to have Stasi 
informers.9 Modern technologies have enabled authoritarian governments to do things that were 
not possible during the Stasi era. Some analysts view the program as an expansion of the 
intensive surveillance of “sensitive groups, such as dissidents to include all people.”2 
 
Publicly questioning or challenge the viewpoint of the CCP would lead to a lower credit score. 
For instance, behaviors, such as those lowering one's score, were reported to include posting 
political opinions without the government's prior permission and describing a different history 
than what the government has told would lead to a reduction in social credit. Publishing anything 
that annoys and embarrasses the government, such as the news related to the 2015 Shanghai 
stock market collapse, would also lower the score. It is argued that information included in the 
rating may also include what books people read. 
 
The base of the CCP's legitimacy has shifted from Marx–Leninism to economic growth and 
prosperity. The CCP, thus, expects Chinese citizens and the country's firms to engage in socially 
or economically productive behavior. Thus, whereas the Stasi's goal was to minimize the threat 
of a revolt against the totalitarian government, China's credit code has broader aims, including 
the promotion of positive economic (e.g., avoiding extravagant consumption) and moral 
(promotion of socialist core values, such as patriotism, respecting the elderly, and working hard) 
behaviors. In this regard, many of the factors presented in Table 1 are linked to the CCP's goal of 
encouraging activities that support economic growth and prosperity and promote a positive 
image of the country. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
 
To be clear, the SCS is much more than a credit score in the financial sense. For instance, 
individuals with a bad “credit code” may experience negative consequences, such as being 
ineligible for certain jobs, housing, or credit to start a company. Likewise, a certain score may be 
needed to get a specific job.2 
 
Individuals may not be able to get a loan or mortgage even if they engage in nonfinancial 
offenses, such as arguing with neighbors. Likewise, nonfinancial “good deeds” such as blood 
donation can lead to a reduced interest rate for loans.3 
 
Individuals with a bad SCS score may not be able to buy business class train tickets. Some may 
not be able to take trains or flights at all.4 In 2018, China banned people from buying plane or 
train tickets 23 million times due to low social credit scores 
(https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/1/18246297/china-transportation-people-banned-poor-social-
credit-planes-trains-2018). Children are banned from going to elite schools if their parents lack a 
good social credit (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-social-credit-system-
school-ban-family-travel-a8821371.html). 
 
Some apps would allegedly tell users if they are near someone who defaulted on debts 
(https://tinyurl.com/yd53emua). An important point to note is that privacy is not viewed as an 
important issue in China. The website of Credit China allows anyone to check anyone else's 
credit score. Moreover, a person's score is also a function of political opinions held by and 
behaviors of the person's friends and acquaintances. This means that individuals that have 
publicly opposed the CCP's ideology or defaulted on debts are likely to have more limited social 
networks. 
 
Beijing's blacklist and redlist reportedly contain more companies than individuals. In 2018, over 
3.59 million enterprises were added to the official blacklist 
(https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2187332/chinas-social-credit-system-
report-shows-richest-provinces-are). Companies can be blacklisted for a number of reasons, such 
as engagement in fraud and generation of excessive pollution. Blacklisted companies are not 
allowed to bid on projects, access security markets, take part in land auctions, and issue 
corporate bonds (https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2187332/chinas-
social-credit-system-report-shows-richest-provinces-are). This might be an indication that China 
is implementing the social control mechanism more aggressively onto companies.4 
 
In general, rewards are mostly handled by commercial entities. Individuals with good scores may 
get discounts at local businesses, pay lower heating bills, or get special invitations to community 
events (https://www.npr.org/2018/10/31/662436265/china-tests-a-social-credit-score). The state 




Data and algorithms for China's SCS are a topic of great current interest. Nonetheless, few 
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